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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
DON SCOTT TAYLOR,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 930381-CA

CHARLEEN TAYLOR,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Section 78-2a-3(2) (h) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended as this
is an appeal from a final order and decree of the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County regarding a divorce action.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the Trial Court abused its discretion and/or erred in
awarding Defendant one-half of the Plaintiff's retirement account
commencing with the date of the parties marriage and terminating on
the date the Decree of Divorce was signed and entered by the Court,
when the Court specifically found that the Plaintiff and Defendant,
other than social contact, have had no contact since they ceased
working as a marital unit and separated in 1984?
2. Was it an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to award
a judgment to Defendant against the Plaintiff in the amount of
$4,500.00 for attorney's fees and cost when the Defendant failed to
show her financial need, and the ability of the Plaintiff to pay
the requested fees, and when there was no determination by the

court as to the reasonableness of the fees proffered by Defendant's
counsel.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1) (1993)
In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3,4, or
6, and in any action to establish an order of
custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or
division of property in a domestic case, the court
may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees,
and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of
the other party to enable the other party to
prosecute or defend the action.
The order may
include provision for costs of the action.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on July 17, 1980 (Tr. , p.
3).

At the time of their marriage Plaintiff was 43 years old and

Defendant was 49 years old.

There were no children born as issue

of this marriage (Tr., p. 3).
At the time of the parties' marriage, Plaintiff was employed
as a U.S. Postal Service mailhandler and was continuously employed
there during the marriage (Tr., p. 15) . Although the Defendant was
employed as a secretary at the time of the parties' marriage, she
decided to quit her job in 1983 and remain at home as a housewife
(Tr., pp. 5-6, 104-105).
The parties separated in 1984 and have had no contact, other
than

social

contact,

since

their

separation

(R.,

p. 133).

Following the parties' separation Plaintiff paid Defendant Five
Hundred Dollars ($500.00) per month until August, 1986.

In 1990,

the Plaintiff was ordered under a temporary order to pay Four
2

Hundred Dollars ($400.00) per month to the Defendant as spousal
support (R., p. 134).
During the course of the Trial, testimony was offered by each
party regarding the date on which the parties ceased working as a
marital

unit and

separated.

The testimony

of both parties

indicated that the separation occurred in 1984 (Tr., pp. 3, 106).
Based

on this testimony Plaintiff

argued that Defendant was

entitled to one-half of the U.S. Postal retirement account the
Plaintiff had accumulated during the time in which the parties were
together and working as a marital unit, thus the appropriate date
on which the Plaintiff's retirement account should be valued and
then divided is the date of the parties' separation in 1984.
Defendant argued that the appropriate date on which the retirement
account should be valued and then divided is the date the marriage
is terminated, in the present case that would be approximately
eight and one-half years from the date of the separation of the
parties.
The Court found the following properties to be pre-marital and
the separate property of the Plaintiff: the Riverton property, the
Dean Whitter utility account, the Cottonwood Canyon Lots 206 and
207, and the Potter Lane Property (R. , p. 138). The Court found
the following property was pre-marital and the separate property of
the Defendant:

a personal residence located at 2128 Kayland Way,

Salt Lake City (R., p. 138).
The Court granted the Plaintiff a divorce from the Defendant
3

on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The Court found the
following was martial property of the parties and should be divided
equally: the Dean Whitter money market account, the First Investor
IRA Account, IDS Account, all of which were accumulated from the
Plaintiff's postal income, and the Montana property (R., p. 137).
Despite the eight and one-half year separation, the Court
ruled the Plaintiff's retirement account with the U.S. Postal
Service should be valued and then divided commencing with the date
of the parties' marriage and terminating on the date the Decree of
Divorce is signed (R., p. 141).
The Plaintiff was also ordered to pay alimony in the amount of
Two Hundred and Twenty-Five Dollars ($225.00) for a period of four
(4) years after the divorce is entered (R., p. 141).
In addition, the Plaintiff was ordered to pay Defendant's
attorney's fees and costs in the amount of Four Thousand Five
Hundred

Dollars

($4,500.00), despite

the

fact

there was no

assertion at trial as to the Defendant's financial need for
attorney fees, nor as to the ability of the Plaintiff to pay the
Defendant's attorney fees, nor was there a determination by the
court as to the reasonableness of the fees proffered by Defendant's
counsel.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In determining alimony and property distribution in divorce
cases, the trial courts have considerable discretion which will be
upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion
4

is demonstrated.
App. 1988) .

Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P. 2d 1331, 1333 (Utah

It is the burden of the party seeking to overturn the

trial court's decision to marshall the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of evidence and, therefore erroneous. Riche v. Riche,
784 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 1989).
Findings of fact in divorce appeals, whether based on oral or
documentary

evidence,

shall

not

erroneous. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a).

be

set

aside

unless

clearly

A finding is clearly erroneous if

it is against the great weight of evidence.
784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989).

Bountiful v. Riley,

The Trial Court's findings must

be supported by the evidence presented at the trial.

Whitehead v.

Whitehead, 836 P. 2d 814 (Utah App. 1992) ; Cumminqs v. Cummincrs, 821
P.2d 421, 474-75 (Utah App. 1991); Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d
421, 423 (Utah App. 1990); Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73,77 (Utah
App. 1991).
On appeal the standard of review for conclusions of law is
correctness and the trial court's conclusions are given no special
deference.

Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991).

Marital property's value is determined as of the time of the
divorce decree or trial.
1222-23 (Utah 1980).
(Utah 1985).

Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d 1218,

See also Berqer v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697

The reason this rule was established is because "by

the very nature of a property division, the marital estate is
5

evaluated according to what property exists as the time the
marriage is terminated." Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328
(Utah 1980) .

However, Courts can in the exercise of their

equitable powers, use a different date, if one party has "acted
obstructively, . . . " Peck v. Peck, 738 P. 2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App.
1987).
With regards to an award of attorney fees and costs, the same
standard of review is applicable and the decision to award attorney
fees is within the sound discretion of the Trial Court, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1) (1993); Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d
1305, 1309 (Utah App. 1991); Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah
App. 1991).

The Trial Court, in using its sound discretion must

take the following three factors into consideration:

(1) the

financial need of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the
other spouse to pay; and (3) the reasonableness of the requested
fees.

Bell, 810 P.2d at 493; Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331,

1337 (Utah App. 1988) . Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court
have reversed attorney fee awards where a party has failed to show
one of the three required factors. See e.g., Newmever v. Newmeyer,
745 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Utah 1987); Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,
426 (Utah App. 1990); Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 123 (Utah App.
1990).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion and/or erred in awarding
Defendant

one-half

of

the

Plaintiff's
6

U.S.

Postal

Service

Retirement Account commencing with the date of the parties1
marriage and terminating on the date that the Decree of Divorce was
signed, which was May 4, 1993, when the court specifically found
that the Plaintiff and Defendant, other than social contact, have
had no contact since they ceased working as a marital unit and
separated in 1984.
The Trial Court abused its discretion and/or erred in awarding
a judgment to Defendant against the Plaintiff in the amount of Four
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00) for attorney's fees and
cost, when the Defendant failed to show her financial need for
attorney's fees, and the ability of the Plaintiff to pay the
requested fees, and no determination was made by the court as to
the reasonableness of the fees proffered by Defendant's counsel.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND/OR ERRED IN
AWARDING DEFENDANT ONE-HALF OF THE PLAINTIFF'S RETIREMENT
ACCOUNT COMMENCING WITH THE DATE OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE
AND TERMINATING ON THE DATE THAT THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
WAS SIGNED, WHEN THE COURT SPECIFICALLY FOUND THAT THE
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, OTHER THAN SOCIAL CONTACT, HAVE
HAD NO CONTACT SINCE THEY CEASED WORKING AS A MARITAL
UNIT AND SEPARATED IN 1984.
In this case, it was inequitable and an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to determine that the Defendant was entitled to
share one-half of the Plaintiff's U.S. Postal Service Retirement
Account commencing with the date of the parties' marriage and
terminating on the date that the Decree of Divorce was signed,
which was May 4, 1993, when the Court specifically found that the
7

Plaintiff and Defendant, other than social contact, have had no
contact since they ceased working as a marital unit and separated
in 1984.
A.

Time Used to Value and Divide Marital Property

Generally the marital estate is valued at the time of trial,
Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah 1985).
not an intractable rule.

But, this is

See Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 688

(Utah App. 1990); Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App.
1987).

"However, the trial court's findings must be sufficiently

detailed to explain its basis for deviating from the general rule."
Morgan, at 688. A court may properly consider such things as the
length of the marriage and parties respective contributions to the
marriage, in making a property division.

Jesperson v. Jesperson,

610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980).
In the case of Peck v. Peck, the Court of Appeals noted that
in view of the evidence adduced at trial, that Plaintiff was unable
to show the current value of the parties1 business because the
Defendant failed to keep records, and that evidence was shown as to
Defendant's mismanagement and large expenditures of corporate
funds, that the trial court might therefore value the business as
of the time the parties separated rather than the date of divorce
decree.
In the case of Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App.
1991), the trial court used the above standard in determining
whether the "standard of living" should be determined for the
8

purpose of calculating alimony from the date of separation or the
date of the trial.

In Howell, the parties were married in 1956,

had five children during their marriage, and separated in 1986.
Plaintiff filed for divorce in November of 1987, the trial occurred
in December

1988.

During the marriage the Defendant was a

homemaker and had held only part time and unskilled labor jobs;
Plaintiff worked with an airline.

Between the time of the

separation and the trial the Plaintiff's income doubled as a result
of a successful takeover by another airline. In light of the facts
of this case, the Court of Appeals held that Plaintiff's ability to
take advantage of the change in salary was at least in part a
result of having persevered during the lean times, as did his wife
and children.
Thus in this case trial court erred in looking at the preseparation standard of living in setting alimony, but the Court of
Appeals acknowledged that trial courts have discretion to determine
the standard of living based on all relevant facts and equitable
principles.
In the present case Plaintiff argues the standard used in the
Howell case also applies to his case.

That the trial court has

discretion to determine the date on which property, in this case,
Plaintiff's retirement account, should be valued

and divided

between the parties. In the present case, the parties were married
only four and one-half years prior to their separation, during the
time of separation in 1984 and the trial in 1992 the Defendant made
9

no contribution to the Plaintiff's retirement account, from the
time of separation the parties pursued their own interests and
lives.

Thus, in light of the facts in the present case it was an

abuse of discretion and/ or err for the court to award the
Defendant one-half of the Plaintiff's retirement account commencing
with the date of the parties marriage and terminating on the date
the Decree of Divorce was signed, rather than on the date the
parties separated and began to pursue their individual lives.
In the case of Hoacrland v. Hoaqland, 212 Utah Adv. Rep 25, 26
(Utah App. May 7, 1993), the trial court found that the marriage
essentially ended when the husband moved out of Utah, despite that
fact that the wife did not file for divorce until over two and onehalf years later. The Court of Appeals held that because the trial
court made relevant findings, supported by relevant evidence and
equitable principles, it did not abuse its discretion in departing
from the general rule and basing alimony on the standard of living
enjoyed at the time of separation.
In the present case, the trial court abused its discretion
and/or erred in awarding Defendant one-half of the Plaintiff's
retirement account from the date of the parties' marriage and
terminating on the date the Decree of Divorce was signed when the
trial court specifically found that other than social contact the
parties had no contact from the date of separation in 1984, and as
in the Hoaqland case the marriage essentially ended when the
Plaintiff moved out.
10

B.

Fair and Equitable Distribution

Equitable distribution is the apportionment of the marital
assets

or property between divorcing parties

in a just and

equitable manner, regardless of the title ownership•

Equitable

division of property upon divorce is responsive to the concept that
marriage is a shared enterprise, a mutual undertaking, and in many
ways is similar to a partnership. Thus, equitable distribution is
awarded to recognize contributions that each spouse had made toward
the accumulation of property during the time span of the viable
marital relationship.

24 Am Jur 2d Equitable Distribution § 870.

The court seeks, by giving both spouses an interest in
"martial property" upon dissolution of marriage, to award economic
credit in the distribution of property for indirect or domestic
contributions to the accumulation of property during the marital
relationship.

Thus, equitable distribution can be used to give

recognition to the essential supportive role played by the spouse
in the home, acknowledging that as a homemaker, partner, and parent
that one should clearly be entitled to a share of the family assets
accumulated during the marriage.

By recognizing and compensating

the homemaker as an equal partner to the marriage, the partner
whose domestic contributions have assisted in giving economic value
to the tangible assets of the marriage. Id.
The Supreme Court of Utah has found that the main purpose of
property division in divorce cases is to achieve a fair, just, and
equitable result between the parties.
11

See Fletcher v. Fletcherr

615 P.2d 1218, 1222

(Utah 1980).

Specifically, the goal is to

allocate property in a manner which "best serves the needs of the
parties and best permits them to pursue their separate lives."
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987).
In the present case, the Defendant established by her own
testimony that once she and the Plaintiff separated that they no
longer discussed their lives together, their children from previous
relationships, their financial concerns nor did they have sexual
relations (Tr., p. 133).

Once the parties separated in 1984 the

Plaintiff and Defendant no longer worked as a marital unit and
Defendant

made

no

contribution

to

the

Plaintiff's

retirement

account, or life for that matter, either directly nor indirectly.
Despite parties' separation Plaintiff voluntarily paid Defendant
the sum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) per month until August,
1986 (R., p. 134) . Later the Plaintiff was under a temporary order
requiring him to pay the Defendant the sum of Four Hundred Dollars
($400.00) per month as spousal support.
Based on the record, Plaintiff and Defendant ceased working as
a marital unit in 1984, approximately four and one-half years after
the parties married, thus, it was inequitable and an abuse of
discretion for the Trial Court to grant the Defendant one-half of
the Plaintiff's retirement account from the date of the parties'
marriage to the signing of the Decree of Divorce, when the Trial
Court

specifically

noted

that

other

than

social

contact, the

parties have had no contact, and ceased working as a marital unit
12

since their separation in 1984.
To permit the Defendant to have one-half of the Plaintiff's
retirement account from the time of the parties separation to the
time of the signing of the divorce decree, eight and one-half years
later, would be a form of unjust enrichment on the part of the
Defendant. Based on the trial court's findings, she will passively
received the benefit of Plaintiff's retirement account which it is
unconscionable

for

her

to

retain,

considering

she

made

no

contribution whatsoever for the property she received during the
eight and one-half years the parties were separation prior to their
divorce.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING
PLAINTIFF TO PAY DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS WHEN
THE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING
HER FINANCIAL NEED, AND PLAINTIFF'S ABILITY TO PAY THE
REQUESTED FEES AND COSTS, AND THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO
MAKE FINDINGS REGARDING THE REASONABLENESS OF THE FEES
PROFFERED.
A.

Attorney Fees

The Trial Court abused its discretion in ordering Plaintiff to
pay Defendant's attorney fees and costs in light of the failure of
the Defendant to show evidence at trial that the Defendant is in
need of financial assistance, and Plaintiff's ability to pay the
fees requested.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1993) empowers a court to use its
sound discretion to order a party to pay to pay the costs, attorney
fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other
13

party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action.
The order may include provision for costs of the action.
In order to award attorney's fees, the court must base its
decision upon evidence of the financial need of the receiving
spouse,

the

ability

of

the

reasonableness of the fees.
(Utah App. 1992);
App. 1991);

other

spouse

to

pay,

and

the

Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P. 2d 841

see also Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah

Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Utah App.

1988) . In determining the reasonableness of the attorney fees the
court

shall

consider

the

necessity

of the

number

of hours

dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the
difficulty of the case and the result accomplished, and the rates
commonly charged for divorce actions in the community. Newmeyer v.
Newmever, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Utah 1987).
In Muir v. Muir. 841 P.2d 736, 741-42 (Utah App. 1992), the
wife claimed that the court abused its discretion in awarding only
$3,000 in attorney fees when the amount proffered was much greater.
The Court of Appeals found that other than its previous finding
relating to an increase in the wife's income, the court failed to
find whether the wife needed financial assistance.

In addition,

the Court found that while the trial court made general findings
regarding the husband's income, it made no findings regarding the
husband's ability to pay wife's attorney fees, nor did the trial
court make findings regarding the reasonableness of the fees
proffered by the wife's attorney.
14

Another

case

that

addresses

this

issue

Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah App. 1992).

is Chambers v.
In that case both

parties appealed the trial court's award of partial reimbursement
of attorney fees to Mrs. Chambers.

The Court found that, "since

the trial court, in awarding attorney fees, did not address the
reasonableness of the fees, and stopped short of finding that each
party would have the means to pay their own fees out of "the money
being distributed to both," such award of attorney fees constituted
an abuse of discretion."
In the present

case, the Defendant

failed

Defendant's financial need for attorney fees.

to show the

The only manner in

which Defendant addressed this issue at trial was as follows:
Defendant's Counsel asked Defendant, "Now, are you asking for some
contribution from Mr. Taylor to help you with the attorney's fees?"
Defendant responds, "Yes."

(Tr., p. 159).

In addition, the

Defendant failed to show the Plaintiff's ability to pay the
requested fees.
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred in
awarding the Defendant attorney fees and costs in the sum of Four
Thousand Five Hundred ($4,500.00) for several reasons.
because

other

than

its

previous

finding

relating

First,
to

the

determination of alimony, the court failed to find whether the
Defendant needed financial assistance.

Second, while the trial

court made general findings regarding Plaintiff's income, it made
no findings regarding Plaintiff's ability to pay Defendant attorney
15

fees.

Finally, the trial court failed to make findings regarding

the reasonableness of the fees the Defendant's attorney proffered.
B.

Costs

In Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 1991), the »
Court of Appeals held that Utah Code Ann. § 3 0-3-3 empowers a court
to use its sound discretion to define costs as those reasonable
amounts that are reasonably expended to prosecute or defend a
divorce action based on need and ability to pay.
In the present case, as previously noted in the Muir case, the
Defendant failed to offer evidence as to her financial need for
assistance to pay for costs incurred in litigating this matter, nor
did the Defendant establish the Plaintiff's ability to pay the
requested costs.
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred in
granting the Defendant's costs without making findings as to the
Defendant's financial need for assistance in paying for costs
incurred in this matter and without determining the Plaintiff's
ability to pay the requested costs, and without making findings
regarding the reasonableness of the costs the Defendant's attorney
proffered.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the trial court's abuse of discretion and/ or
err in awarding Defendant one-half of the Plaintiff's U.S. Postal
Service Retirement Account commencing with the date of the parties'
marriage and terminating on the date that the Decree of Divorce was
16

signed, the Defendant has been unjustly enriched. The Court, using
its equitable powers, should order that the Defendant is only
entitled

to

one-half

of

the

Plaintiff's

retirement

account

commencing with the date of the parties1 marriage and terminating
on the date the parties' separated and ceased working together as
a martial unit.
The trial court's determination regarding attorney fees and
costs is not supported by the record.

Thus, the Court should not

have awarded attorney fees and costs to the Defendant.
DATED this

day of

_ J[jj0LUZt

1993.

0
DAVID PAUL WHITE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
7434 SOUTH STATE, #102
MIDVALE UT
84047
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ITEM 2
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law

MAY 0 4 1SS3
STEVEN C. TYCKSEN (3300)
Attorney for Defendant
45 E. Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801)262-6800
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DON SCOTT TAYLOR,

:

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

vs.

:

CHARLEEN TAYLOR,

:

Case No. 904904902 DA
Honorable Frank G. Noel

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial before the
above-entitled Court, on the 2nd day of November, 1992, before the
Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Court Judge, presiding and sitting
without jury.

The Plaintiff appeared in person and by his attorney,

David Paul White.

The Defendant appeared in person and by her

attorney, Steven C. Tycksen.

The Court received evidence on behalf

of each of the parties, and after being fully advised in the
premises, now makes and enters its, Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That Plaintiff and Defendant are bona fide and actual

residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and have been for at
least three (3) months immediately prior to the commencement of this
action.
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2.

That Plaintiff and Defendant are married having been legally

wed at Salt Lake City, State of Utah on July 17, 1980.
3.

That more than 90 days has expired since the commencement of

this action.
4.

That grounds for divorce exist pursuant to Utah Code

Annotated Section 30-3-1, in that there are irreconcilable
differences in the marriage, such that the marriage cannot continue.
5.

That there are no minor children born as issue of this

marriage and none are expected.
6.

The Court finds that at the time of the parties marriage

they were possessed of the following pre-marital properties:
For the Plaintiff:
a.

A duplex located on 453 "E" Street in Salt Lake City

b.

A fourplex located on 655 South 10th West in Salt Lake
City

c.

A personal residence on Wren Road

d.

Two cabin lots in Big Cottonwood Canyon

For the Defendant:
a.

A personal residence located at 2128 Kayland Way, Salt
Lake City

b.
7.

A savings account of approximately $30,000.

At the time of the parties' marriage, Plaintiff was employed

as a U.S. Postal Service mailhandler and has been continuously there
employed during the marriage and is currently earning $3,150 gross

orsno

per month, with a net after tax income of approximately $2,000.
8.

The mortgage on Defendant's home was fully paid off at the

time of her marriage to Plaintiff.
of any kind on said home.

Further there were no other liens

There was no other evidence of any

significant debts for which Defendant would have been liable at the
time of her marriage to Plaintiff.
9.

During the marriage Defendant quit her employ in 1983 and

remained at home to take care of Plaintiff's and her own children who
were both living in their marital home.
10.

Defendant is now 61 years of age and has only recently

received her first full time job since 1983.

She has recently

secured a position of employment as a receptionist for Intermountain
Health Care, earning $1,150 per month gross and $890 net after taxes.
11.

Plaintiff's reasonable and necessary monthly living expenses

are $1,650.
$1,250.
$350.

Defendant's reasonable and necessary living expenses are

Plaintiff has a net income surplus after his expenses of

Defendant has a need for additional income to meet her monthly

expenses in the amount of $350.
12.

The parties have had no contact since their separation in

1984 other than social contact.
13.

During the marriage the parties entered into an installment

contract to purchase some property in Montana.
jointly at first.

The property was held

The parties later granted an undivided one-half

interest to the family trusts of both Plaintiff and Defendant.
3
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Following the parties7 separation the property suffered a decline in
value and Plaintiff made a deal to trade title to part of the
property for title free and clear to the remainder.

This remaining

property was then sold on an installment contract and the proceeds
have been divided equally between the parties ever since.
14.

Following the parties' separation Plaintiff paid Defendant

$500.00 per month until August, 1986. He was ordered under a
temporary order to pay $400.00 per month to Defendant as spousal
support.
15.

The Montana property was purchased during the parties7

marriage.
a.

At the time of the parties7 separation in about 1984,

Defendant began making payments on the Montana property in the amount
of Three Hundred and Forty-One Dollars ($341.00) per month.
b.

During the time that Defendant made payments on the

Montana property Plaintiff paid to Defendant the sum of Five Hundred
Dollars ($500.00) per month.

At times the payment made by Defendant

on the Montana property was taken from this Five Hundred Dollar
($500.00) amount with the balance being used for living expenses and
at other times the payment was taken from Defendant's savings.

The

Court cannot determine from the evidence how much was taken from
Defendant's savings for payment on the Montana property and how much
was used from the Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) per month she
received from Plaintiff.
4
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c.

There was no agreement between the parties that any oi

the Five Hundred Dollar ($500.00) amount would be used for payment c
the Montana property.

The Defendant made payments on the Montana

property because in her view Plaintiff was not going to do so.
d.

At the same time that Plaintiff stopped making payments

to Defendant he then began making the payment himself on the Montana
property for a period of approximately six (6) months at which time
the property was sold.
e.

Defendant entered the marriage with Thirty Thousand

Dollars ($30,000.00) in savings and at the time of the divorce had
approximately Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) to Seven Hundred Dollars
($700.00) remaining.
f.

Of the Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00), One

Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) was used for a portion of the down
payment on the Montana property.

The Plaintiff paid the balance of

the down payment in the amount of approximately Thirty-Nine Thousand
Dollars ($39,000.00).
g.

There is no evidence that Defendant used any portion of

her Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) for the payment of marital
debts other than the Montana property as has already been described
by the Court.

Said Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) was also

used in part for living expenses both before and after the separation
of the parties.
16.

In 1980 Plaintiff sold the two cabin lots on contract to
5

Terra Corp.

Terra Corp. filed bankruptcy in 1982.

From 1983 to 1991

Plaintiff expended $4,800 in legal bills and $2,500 as a settlement
to reacquire the properties.

The source of these expenditures was

his postal income earned during that period.

The lots once

reacquired were placed in Plaintiff's name solely.
17.

During the marriage Plaintiff loaned money to his son.

The

source of the proceeds of the loan was savings accumulated from his
postal income.

Plaintiff's son defaulted on the loan, and to settle

the debt deeded a 1/3 interest in some Heber City property to
Plaintiff (the property is described by the parties as 7.7 acres of
rural ground on Potter Lane in Heber City).

The Plaintiff's 1/3

interest in this property is worth $6,667.

The property was not

vested in the parties' names jointly.

The water stock, however, was

held jointly.
18.

During the marriage Plaintiff traded his equity in the

fourplex for penny stock which later became worthless.
19.

During the marriage Plaintiff sold his duplex for a contract

receivable which he then traded together with the equity in his home
on Wren Road for a down payment on 7 acres of property in Riverton.
After this trade he was left with a debt owing of $30,000, on which
he has paid monthly principal and interest payments since 1984. He
has paid a total of $42,000 in payments and owes a balance of $8,000.
20.

During the marriage Plaintiff accumulated several liquid

asset accounts as follows:
6
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a.

Dean Witter money market account of approximately

$6,000, which Plaintiff accumulated from Plaintiff's postal income.
b.

First Investor IRA Account in the amount of $2,868,

which was accumulated from Plaintiff's postal income.
c.

IDS account in the amount of $1,754, which was

accumulated from Plaintiff's postal income.
21.

The parties did not jointly accumulate any personal property

and have divided their personal assets to their mutual satisfaction.
22.

The Plaintiff has a retirement plan through the Postal

Service to which he has made contributions throughout the marriage.
23.

The Defendant has expended attorney's fees totaling

$4,737.11 up to the point of trial plus additional sums for trial
time and post-trial work.
24.

The Defendant desires to be restored to the name of Tomich

and the Court finds no legal reason not to do so.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters
the following Conclusions of Law:
1.

That the Plaintiff should be granted a divorce from the

Defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
2.

That the following is the marital property of the parties

and should be divided equally:
Dean Witter money market account
7

$6,000

First Investor IRA Account

2,868

IDS Account

1, 754

Montana property
3.

18,000

That the Plaintiff and Defendant have each received and

should be allowed to keep one-half of the proceeds from the Montana
property.
4.

The following properties shall be considered pre-marital and

separate property of the Plaintiff:
Riverton property
Dean Whitter utility account
Cottonwood Canyon Lots 206 and 207
Potter Lane Property
5.

The following property shall be considered the pre-marital

and separate property of the Defendant:
Home located on Kayland Way, Salt Lake City
6.

The Plaintiff's retirement accumulated during the marriage

shall be considered marital property.
7.

The Defendant shall be awarded one-half of the Plaintiff's

retirement commencing with the date of the parties' marriage and
terminating on the date that the Decree of Divorce is signed.

A

Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue to effectuate the
same.
8.
age 65.

The Defendant has need for alimony until she can retire at
Plaintiff has the ability to pay alimony and it is just and
8
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equitable that the Plaintiff shall be required to pay alimony to the
Defendant in the amount of $225.00 for a period of four (4) years
after the divorce is entered.

At the end of the four year period,

the Defendant shall be eligible for retirement and the combination of
the social security income she will then receive plus her one-half
interest in the Defendant's retirement should then terminate her need
for alimony at that point.
9.

That the parties shall each be awarded those items of

personal property currently in his or her own possession.
10.

The Defendant shall be restored to her previous name of

Charleen Tomich.
11.

Defendant has need and Plaintiff has the ability to pay and

it is fair and equitable in view of all the circumstances of this
case that Defendant be awarded judgment against the Plaintiff in the
amount of $4,500.00 as and for attorney's fees and costs incurred in
this matter.
12.

The Plaintiff shall pay his own attorney's fees and costs

incurred in this setter.
Dated this

day of

19A

Frank G. Noel
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVEDCU* >U ^ H ^ \%M
David Payd. White"
Attorney for Plaintiff
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ITEM 3

Decree of Divorce

[JIMW

•:/.,

STEVEN C. TYCKSEN (3300)
Attorney for Defendant
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-6800

HAY 0 h 1993

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DON SCOTT TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs .
CHARLEEN TAYLOR,
Case No. 904904902 DA
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the aboveentitled Court on the 2nd day of November, 1992, before the Honorable
Frank G. Noel, District Court Judge, presiding and sitting without a
jury.

The Plaintiff appeared in person and by his attorney, David

Paul White.

The Defendant appeared in person and by her attorney,

Steven C. Tycksen.

The Court having then received evidence on behalf

of each of the parties, and, being fully advised in the premises and
having rendered its decision herein by way of written Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and it appearing therefrom that judgment
should be entered for the Plaintiff in accordance therewith and as
hereinafter set forth,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:

1.

That the Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving

le bonds of matrimony between Plaintiff and Defendant.

Said Decree

lall become final upon entry.
2.

The Plaintiff is herewith awarded the Dean Whitter Money

rket Account, First Investor IRA Account and IDS Account.
3.

The Defendant is herewith awarded judgment against the

aintiff in the amount of $5,311.00, as one half of the marital
/estment accounts.
4.

The Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded one-half of

proceeds from the Montana property.

This property has already

>n divided between the parties and no further distribution is
essary or contemplated by this order and each may keep that which
y have heretofore received.
5.

The Defendant is herewith awarded one-half of the

intiff's retirement account with the U.S. Postal Service
lancing with the date of the parties' marriagp and tejminating on
datp that the Decree of Divorce is signed and entered by the
t

A Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue to

ctuate the same.
6.

The Plaintiff is ordered to pay alimony to the Defendant in

amount of $225.00 for a period of four (4) years after entry of
Decree of Divorce.
7.

The parties are each awarded those items of personal

erty currently in his or her own possession.
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8.

The Defendant is herewith restored to her name from her

ist marriage of Tomich.
9.

Defendant is herewith awarded judgment against the Plaintiff

the amount of $4,500.00 as and for attorney's fees incurred in
is matter.
10.

The Plaintiff is ordered to pay his own attorney's fees and

"Ls incurred in this matter.
Dated this ( I

day of

A ([(j- , , , 1993.
/\

r

- >- °r ^>/ {

F r a n k GJ No£l->' J}//-H
DISTRICT COURT,JUP&te

id Pa til W h i t e
o m e y for P l a i n t i f f

A N O 7 / t * y 1 o r

d e c
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